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1. Introduction 
Before the crisis, the countries of central and eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia 
(CEECCA)
1 seemed to be making rapid and reasonably smooth economic progress, following 
an extraordinarily deep recession after the collapse of the communist regimes. The 
development model of most CEECCA countries had many common features, such as deep 
political, institutional, trade and financial integration with the EU and significant labour 
mobility to EU15 countries. However, there were also substantial differences between 
countries, which became more notable in the run-up to the global crisis: in a few CEECCA 
countries catching up was generally accompanied by macroeconomic stability, but most 
countries of the region became increasingly vulnerable due to huge credit, housing and 
consumption booms, high current-account deficits and quickly rising external debt. It was 
widely expected even before the crisis that these vulnerabilities must be corrected at some 
point, but the magnitude of the corrections when they did happen were amplified by the 
global financial and economic crisis. 
 
Beyond the crisis, a major question is if the crisis is likely to have lasting economic effects. 
This paper assesses pre-crisis growth drivers and the medium term prospects of the CEECCA 
region using cross-country growth regressions, which estimate – in cross-section and panel 
regression frameworks – empirical relationships between growth and a number of potential 
growth drivers.  
 
Many papers have adopted cross-country growth regressions for CEECCA countries; see for 
example Schadler et al (2006), Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey (2006), Abiad et al (2007), 
Vamvakidis (2008), Cihak and Fonteyne (2009), Iradian (2009), European Commission 
(2009), and Böwer and Turrini (2010), just to mention a few more recent papers. However, all 
of these papers used sample periods that ended before the crisis and covered only the boom 
years of the 2000s, this boom proving unsustainable in many CEECCA countries. It should be 
emphasised that CEECCA countries have been hit harder by the crisis than other countries, 
                                                 
1 The CEECCA countries that formerly belonged to the political and economic sphere of the Soviet Union have a 
common historical root but are rather diverse. Ten countries are members of the European Union (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia); seven countries 
in the western Balkan are either EU accession candidates or potential candidates (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo under 
UNSC Resolution 1244/99, though we do not include Kosovo in our study due to lack of data); and twelve 
countries form the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), of which five are major hydrocarbon exporters 
(Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) while the other seven are not (Armenia, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan and Ukraine). Mongolia is also a transition country, 
while Turkey – another EU candidate – is not, but we also include it in our study due to its geographical 
closeness.   2
and post-crisis recovery is also generally slower for CEECCA countries than in other 
emerging and developing economies (Bruegel and wiiw, 2010). Making estimates for a 
sample period that proved to be unsustainable will obviously bias the results toward the 
finding of higher growth. When the sample includes mostly booming countries, the estimated 
relationships between growth and fundamentals are distorted. When the sample includes a 
large cross section of countries over a long time horizon, and the booming countries are in a 
minority, but are differentiated with a dummy (which is done in most of the literature), then 
the estimate of this dummy is likely upward biased. Therefore, even though the crisis-period 
data are also hardly representative of standard conditions and in most, if not all, countries the 
output gap turned to negative, including the bust phase of the economic cycle in the sample is 
inevitable.  
 
In our paper, we attempt a comprehensive consideration of the crisis and perform extensive 
robustness checks of cross-country growth regressions. To this end, we extend the sample 
period up to 2010, using more recent data up to 2009 and forecasts for 2010; the forecasts are 
primarily taken from the IMF’s April 2010 World Economic Outlook and the July 2010 
forecasts of the Economist Intelligence Unit. The use of forecasts brings uncertainty to the 
estimates, but perhaps the possible errors in 2010 forecasts made in April and July 2010 are 
not so large, and since we use time-averaged data (eg five year averages for 2006-10), the 
impact of the use of forecasts may be small
2. We perform the calculations both for the pre-
crisis sample and for this extended sample period, studying the results for different country 
groups, different sample periods and a number of possible explanatory variables. We aim to 
answer the following three questions: 
 
•  How much does the crisis alter the within-sample fit of cross-country growth 
regressions? We answer this question by presenting estimates for both the pre-crisis 
period and for the full period that also includes the crisis. 
•  Has growth in CEECCA countries (or some sub-groups within this region) been 
different from the rest of world in the sense that these countries grew more quickly than 
what would have been implied by their fundamental growth determinants? The 
literature has approached this question by studying the parameters of a dummy variable 
                                                 
2 We should highlight that forecasts for many explanatory variables are not necessary because these explanatory 
variables represent initial conditions that lag some years compared to growth, though there are some 
contemporaneous correlates as well. When it is only the regressand, the growth rate of GDP contains a 
measurement error due to the adoption of forecasts, it boosts the standard error of the estimate but does not 
distort the unbiasedness of the regression.   3
representing certain country groups in the growth regression. We perform two main 
tasks in examining this question: (1) We study the robustness of the estimated parameter 
of country group dummies in the context of the crisis. (2) For the ten central and eastern 
European countries (CEE10) that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 we set up a 
counterfactual scenario for the fundamentals (eg capital inflows, trade integration, 
institutional development) under which no EU enlargement occurred, basing the 
scenario on the developments in non-EU middle income countries. We then use our 
estimated models to simulate the growth effects of the incremental improvement of 
fundamentals due to prospective and actual EU membership. 
•  How much has the crisis altered future GDP growth scenarios? The change in 
projections can be traced back to two factors: (1) change in the model and (2) change in 
the assumed path of explanatory variables. The econometric estimates provide an 
explanation for the first factor, and we shall formulate different scenarios for the second 
factor, drawing on the experience of previous crises. 
 
We find that  
•  The crisis has altered the within-sample fit of cross-country growth regressions: the 
downward revision of fitted values of GDP growth from the regressions is between one 
and three percent per year for most countries; 
•  The positive impact of EU enlargement on growth is smaller than previous research has 
shown: the dummy variable approach indicated that in the 2000s overall, the CEE10 
countries seemed to grow only by about 0.3-0.4 percent per year more than what would 
have been implied by their fundamentals, while the counterfactual simulation indicated 
about 0.15 percent per year extra growth in the second half of the 2000s because of the 
incremental improvement of fundamentals due to EU enlargement, though these results 
are generally not statistically significant; 
•  The crisis has also altered future GDP growth scenarios: even in the optimistic scenario 
that assumes a return to the pre-crisis development of fundamentals, medium-term 
outlooks are below pre-crisis actual growth, especially in those countries that 
experienced substantial credit and consumption booms before the crisis. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses our methodology and model 
selection issues. The results of the growth regressions are presented in section 3. We also 
answer our first research question in this section. Section 4 discusses the effect of EU 
enlargement on the growth of new EU member states and presents a discussion of the second   4
research question. The third research question is analysed in section 5. Section 6 presents a 
summary. 
 
2. Methodology and model selection issues 
The execution of cross-country growth regressions typically involves a large degree of 
discretion. One issue is related to the length of the sample period: the longer the sample, the 
more precise the estimate, provided that there are no structural breaks. However, the pre-
transition developments (when CEECCA countries operated under different economic 
systems) and the first years of transition (when these countries introduced market-oriented 
reforms and experienced extensive structural change) are not informative for current growth 
prospects because of significant structural breaks. Consequently, it is rather difficult to set an 
appropriate start date for the sample period. Figure 1 shows GDP per capita at purchasing 
power parity compared to the EU15 for the countries we study, in comparison to some Latin 
American and Asian countries from 1980-2010 (where available). Figure 1 clearly shows the 
extraordinarily deep recession that accompanied the first years of transition
3, but also the 
quick catching-up that followed in most countries, which can partly be regarded as a kind of 
‘reconstruction’ after the deep recession. The recession lasted just for a few years in the case 
of the CEE10 countries and some south-eastern European countries, but in most 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, it lasted longer. Both the recession and 
the reconstruction period complicate the selection of a start date for the sample period.  
 
Another issue is whether or not the sample should include panel data at a yearly frequency, 
time-averaged data over non-overlapping intervals, or time-averaged pure cross-section data. 
The advantage of a cross-section setup is that issues related to dynamic panels do not arise 
and endogeneity is less of a concern, though causality cannot be claimed, unless suitable 
instruments are found. It is very difficult to find suitable instruments. For example, Iradian 
(2009) uses a set of instruments for the reform indexes, such as the distance to Brussels, the 
share of commodity exports as percent of total export, and some others, but for other 
                                                 
3 It was widely expected that countries undergoing transition would experience an initial decline in output and 
employment, but the depth and the length of the post-communist recession were unexpected (Fischer, 2002; 
Svejnar 2006). The literature has proposed various explanations for this phenomenon. Svejnar (2006) categorises 
them into six main themes. First, a disorganisation among suppliers, producers and consumers associated with 
the central planning; second, the dissolution in 1990 of Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), 
which governed trade relations across the Soviet bloc; third, difficulties of sectoral shifts in the presence of 
labour market imperfections; fourth, a switch from controlled to uncontrolled monopolistic structures in these 
economies; fifth, a credit crunch stemming from the reduction in state subsidies to firms and rise in real interest 
rates; and finally, tight macroeconomic policies may have played a role in the depth and length of the recession.   5
endogenous variables, such as fiscal balance, investment rate or inflation, he could not 
assemble suitable instruments. 
 
Figure 1: GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (EU15=100), 1980-2010 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on data from IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010 and EBRD. 
 
The selection of the country sample is another key issue. The very reason behind cross-
country regressions is that the countries in the sample share similar characteristics; when 
many countries are included, the country-specific factors or the effects of randomness on the 
results could be lessened. However, certain countries may have significantly different 
characteristics, eg the same factors may have different effects on growth in very small 
countries compared to major developed economies. The level of a country's development also 
has an important bearing on growth drivers
4.  
 
A further issue is the selection of variables. This can also be subject to a large degree of 
discretion, because there are many indicators that can be used to measure a certain factor that 
are more or less correlated. The actual results may be sensitive to the selection of the variables 
                                                 
4 See Veugelers (2010) for a discussion of the different role of various factors for technological progress along 
the development path.   6
used
5. In a seminal article, Levine and Renelt (1992) find in a growth regression framework 
that very few economic variables are robustly correlated with economic growth rates. They 
could only detect positive and robust correlation between average growth rates and two 
variables: the investment rate (share of investment in GDP) and trade openness (the share of 
trade in GDP). But they could not detect robust correlation for a broad array of other potential 
explanatory variables. The extensive survey presented in Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005) 
broadly confirms these findings and concludes that “growth econometrics is an area of 
research that is still in its infancy” (p. 651). 
 
When we have looked for a single best model, we have indeed found considerable sensitivity 
to the time period, the country sample and the set of variables, which is in line with the 
findings of Levine and Renelt (1992) and the literature survey of Durlauf, Johnson and 
Temple (2005)
6. We try to overcome these issues by concentrating on sample periods that 
start well after the collapse of the communist regimes, studying different country samples and 
using various explanatory variables to form different models and study a number of 
combinations of them. 
 
We use three different time periods: 
1.  Cross section data for 2000-07; 
2.  Cross section data for 2000-10; 
3.  Panel data with three non-overlapping five-year periods between 1995-2010
7. 
 
We use four different country samples (constrained by data availability only):  
(1) all countries of the world; 
(2) countries with population above 1 million; 
                                                 
5 Few authors acknowledge as honestly as Berg et al (1999) that results could be sensitive to model selection: “In 
other words, the same dataset could be used to make contradictory claims about the significance or lack of 
significance of various policy variables. Ad-hoc regressions of growth on a small number of policy variables, 
abundant as they are in the literature, thus deserve skepticism.” (p52). 
6 Multicollinearity among some variables may also explain the difficulties in finding a single best model. Note 
that multicollinearity affects the parameter estimates and their standard errors, but it does not reduce the 
predictive power or reliability of the model as a whole. 
7 The sample period 2000-07 includes GDP growth from 2000 to 2007, ie the average annualised growth from 
2000 until 2007, that is, during seven years. In the regressions, initial conditions from the year 2000 will be used, 
while contemporaneous correlates will be averaged for the same period as GDP growth, ie the average between 
2001 and 2007. The 2000-10 sample should be interpreted similarly, as should the panel sample, which consists 
of three five-year periods: 1995-2000, 2000-05 and 2005-10.   7
(3) middle-income countries with population above 1 million (ie GDP per capita at PPP 
compared to the US between 12.5 percent and 67.4 percent, though we also add those 
CEECCA countries that have lower income); 
(4) CEECCA countries only. 
 
Exclusion of very small countries can be justified on the basis that their economies could be 
less diversified and hence could strongly be affected by particular shocks related to their main 
business activity. The exclusion of both poor and rich countries can be justified on the basis 
that economic growth in countries with reasonably similar levels of development might show 
more similarity to one other than to much richer or poorer countries. The cut-off values 
indicated above were determined on the basis of CEE10 countries: we calculated their 
minimum (23.0 percent for Bulgaria) and maximum (56.9 percent for Slovenia) and the 
standard deviation, which was subtracted from the minimum and added to the maximum to 
determine a possible range
8. However, we also include in this middle-income country group 
those seven CIS countries that have lower per capita income, as well as Mongolia, in order to 
be able to analyse all CEECCA countries using the same model. 
 
Considering the variables to be analysed, initial GDP per capita at purchasing power parity 
(PPP) was found in the literature to be the most robust explanatory variable and we of course 
also include it, having found that it is indeed a robust explanatory variable. We have also 
considered variables that are frequently used in the empirical growth literature, such as the 
investment rate, trade openness, educational indicators, the dependency ratio, inflation, fiscal 
balance, research and development expenditures and patents.  
 
The four key pillars of the development model of most CEECCA countries were financial, 
trade and institutional integration with the western world and labour mobility
9. We have 
therefore employed the following variables related to these factors: 
•  Capital flows: inward FDI per GDP (both stock and inflow); investment rate (gross 
fixed capital formation over GDP); stock and change in private sector credit/GDP. 
•  Foreign trade: trade openness (exports plus imports over GDP); change in the terms of 
trade; share of fuel and food in total exports.  
                                                 
8 We used the average GDP per capita at PPP compared to the US in the 2000-10 period. 
9 There are clear differences within the CEECCA region, however. The CEE10 have reached the highest level of 
integration, followed by the countries of the western Balkans that have either EU ‘candidate’ or ‘potential 
candidate’ status. The six ‘Eastern Partnership’ countries, which were part of the Soviet Union, have reached a 
varying degree of integration with the EU15, while integration was generally minor for most of the other former 
Soviet Union countries.    8
•  Institutional development: governance indicators complied by the World Bank; 
Transparency International's corruption perception index; Economic Freedom Network 
indicators. 
•  Migration: remittances over GDP
10. 
 
We also introduced a new variable that we have termed 'GDP historical gap' to measure the 
ratio of a country’s comparative output, measured by its current GDP per capita at PPP 
compared to the US, to the country’s maximum comparative output in the past. The intuition 
is that countries that were closer to the US at a point in time in the past may have a better 
chance to catch up than other countries with similar fundamentals, because catching-up in this 
case implies reaching a level that has already been reached in the past. This variable has a low 
value after a crisis, such as the economic collapse during the first years of transition. This 
variable is applied to all countries in the sample, not just to CEECCA countries, and is 
calculated for every year starting in 1980
11. Among our main country groups, the CIS 
countries still score low in this measure as they have not yet reached their pre-transition levels 
compared to the US
12.  
 
Because of the difficulties in finding a single best model, we adopt the pragmatic approach of 
running many regressions, each of which are ‘acceptable’ in a sense that we will discuss 
shortly. We then combine them. The combination of many regressions also serves as a 
robustness check. 
 
We first identified potential growth drivers and correlates in the following way. We adopted 
the three temporal samples and four country samples discussed thus far (ie 12 samples 
altogether) and estimated cross-section and panel regressions, including constant and initial 
GDP per capita at PPP, as well as period fixed effects for the panels. We always controlled for 
initial GDP per capita at PPP because this variable proved to be the most robust variable in 
practically all cross-country growth regressions. We chose from a large number of variables 
and we have of course included the two variables that were found by Levine and Renelt 
                                                 
10 Unfortunately, it is difficult to collect reliable data on migration for a wide range of countries and time 
periods. 
11 For most CEECCA countries the available data starts in 1989 with the exception of a few, for which data for 
earlier years is also available. 
12 Falcetti et al (2006) and Iradian (2009) use a discrete dummy variable to measure the same phenomenon. The 
dummy takes a value of 1 if output in a given year is below 70 percent of its 1989 value. Böwer and Turrini 
(2010) adopt a continuous variable to capture this effect and hence it is the closest to our variable: they define an 
'output loss' variable as the ratio of current output to the average output during 1990-95.   9
(1992): the investment rate and trade openness. We then added only one other possible growth 
determinant at a time. When a variable had a correctly signed (judged from economic 
principles) and significant parameter estimate in most of the 12 samples – controlling for the 
initial GDP per capita and period fixed effects – we regarded it as a useful candidate for the 
growth regressions.  
 
The results of this exercise are shown in Table 1. Among the 33 variables considered we have 
selected 13 candidates for the growth regressions. When selecting the variables we aimed for 
balance; that is, we do not want to over-represent any particular kind of indicator, such as 
institutional quality, for which many variants tend to correlate well with GDP growth. We 
selected seven initial conditions: GDP historical gap, secondary school enrolment, 
dependency rate, legal system and property rights, freedom of trade, share of fuel exports, and 
the stock of inward FDI. We also selected six contemporaneous correlates: fiscal 
balance/GDP, investment/GDP, exports plus imports/GDP, change in the terms of trade, 
growth in credit to private sector/GDP, and FDI inflow/GDP. The inclusion of 
contemporaneous correlates obviously raises the issue of endogeneity, which could be 
handled, for example, by properly-selected instruments. However, as we have already argued, 
the selection of good instruments is rather difficult if not impossible. We have reviewed many 
papers in the literature that could not find proper instruments. Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) 
demonstrated that the possible adoption of weak instruments renders conventional 
instrumental-variable inferences misleading. Hauk and Wacziarg (2009) studied bias 
properties of estimators commonly used to estimate growth regressions with Monte Carlo 
simulations and concluded that the simple OLS estimator applied to a single cross-section of 
variables averaged over time performed the best. For all these reasons we do not use 
instrumental variables, but apply OLS. This implies that we cannot interpret our results in a 
causal way (eg higher investment leads to higher growth); rather, the interpretation of the 
relationship as a correlation is sufficient for our purposes.  
 
Having selected 13 potential variables, we run growth regressions with all possible quartets 
(ie 4-element subsets) of the 13 variables. There are 715 such quartets (13!/(4!*9!)). Our 
initial conditioning variable (GDP per capita compared to the US) is always included, as well 
as time-period fixed effects for the panels.
13 In the next sections, which show our results, we 
report the whole distribution of the growth estimates from the 715 regressions. If the ‘true 
                                                 
13 We note that either the investment rate or trade openness (the two robust variables in Levine and Renelt, 1992) 
are included in 385 of 715 regressions (and of these 385 regressions they are jointly included in 55 ones).   10
model’ is among our estimated models and the distribution of the growth fits is reasonably 
dense, we may regard our result as robust. 
Table 1: Partial correlation with growth 
CS 
2000-
2007
CS 
2000-
2010
P 
1995-
2010
CS 
2000-
2007
CS 
2000-
2010
P 
1995-
2010
CS 
2000-
2007
CS 
2000-
2010
P 
1995-
2010
CS 
2000-
2007
CS 
2000-
2010
P 
1995-
2010
initial conditions
GDP historical gap (compared to pre- -2.33 -2.36 -1.52 -2.31 -1.55 -0.78 -4.04 -3.05 -2.63 -4.57 -2.27 -4.10
vious maximum relative to US)            t -1.54 -1.71 -1.40 -1.66 -1.38 -0.73 -2.75 -2.62 -1.60 -1.50 -0.86 -1.05
Nobs. 178 177 531 146 145 435 66 66 198 30 30 90
Secondary enrolment (net) 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.04
t - 0 . 1 0 - 1 . 4 5 - 1 . 5 22 . 2 80 . 9 01 . 2 03 . 6 82 . 1 72 . 9 51 . 0 0 - 0 . 3 71 . 1 9
Nobs. 141 140 332 113 112 267 56 56 132 26 26 57
Tertiary enrolment -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.05
t -1.03 -2.35 -3.58 0.74 -0.90 -2.72 1.99 0.68 -1.56 0.49 -0.99 -1.83
Nobs. 132 131 372 117 116 336 57 57 169 25 25 75
Dependency rate -2.80 0.07 -0.89 -5.46 -2.17 -2.85 -4.87 -0.36 -4.07 3.82 7.10 -6.74
t -1.67 0.05 -0.70 -3.48 -1.80 -2.14 -1.86 -0.17 -1.25 0.67 1.51 -0.74
Nobs. 173 172 516 145 144 432 65 65 195 30 30 90
Corruption perception -0.49 -0.36 -0.70 -0.41 -0.23 -0.30 -0.45 -0.27 -0.30 -0.33 -0.63 -0.53
t -2.52 -2.04 -2.80 -2.09 -1.44 -2.73 -1.69 -1.19 -2.18 -0.42 -0.91 -1.33
Nobs. 87 86 238 86 85 225 45 45 111 20 20 49
Voice & Accountability -1.21 -1.32 -1.31 -0.69 -0.85 -0.75 -0.64 -0.89 -0.93 -0.75 -1.25 -1.36
t -3.51 -4.30 -4.74 -2.05 -3.39 -3.18 -1.55 -2.77 -3.36 -0.89 -1.98 -2.42
Nobs. 176 175 352 145 144 290 66 66 132 29 29 58
Political stability -0.42 -0.61 -0.52 -0.14 -0.29 -0.10 0.03 -0.15 -0.24 0.72 0.29 0.20
t -1.34 -2.16 -2.06 -0.42 -1.17 -0.38 0.07 -0.52 -0.86 0.95 0.54 0.32
Nobs. 173 172 349 145 144 290 66 66 132 29 29 58
Government effectiveness -0.87 -1.19 -1.09 -0.16 -0.46 -0.20 -0.54 -0.77 -0.85 -0.10 -1.28 -1.20
t -1.56 -2.23 -2.37 -0.29 -1.11 -0.49 -0.94 -1.79 -2.39 -0.06 -1.15 -1.28
Nobs. 175 174 351 144 143 289 66 66 132 29 29 58
Regulatory quality -1.18 -1.39 -1.46 -0.77 -0.95 -0.94 -0.85 -1.03 -1.08 -0.73 -1.34 -1.25
t -2.33 -3.17 -3.61 -1.66 -2.80 -2.88 -1.67 -2.73 -3.10 -0.79 -2.05 -1.97
Nobs. 176 175 352 145 144 290 66 66 132 29 29 58
Rule of law -0.93 -1.13 -0.99 -0.23 -0.38 -0.06 -0.36 -0.46 -0.59 -0.16 -0.71 -1.11
t -1.94 -2.40 -2.40 -0.48 -1.04 -0.16 -0.76 -1.30 -1.86 -0.16 -1.05 -1.54
Nobs. 175 174 351 144 143 289 66 66 132 29 29 58
Control of corruption -1.38 -1.46 -1.29 -0.84 -0.76 -0.54 -0.73 -0.66 -0.82 -0.65 -1.27 -1.91
t -2.60 -2.94 -2.93 -1.78 -2.08 -1.37 -1.52 -1.79 -2.42 -0.50 -1.29 -1.96
Nobs. 175 174 351 144 143 289 66 66 132 29 29 58
Size of government 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 -0.25 -0.10 -0.08 0.01 -0.18 -0.05
t 0.71 0.70 0.90 0.57 0.57 0.65 -2.22 -1.09 -0.62 0.02 -1.41 -0.15
Nobs. 121 120 376 112 111 348 49 49 157 15 15 56
Legal system & property rights -0.14 -0.20 0.06 -0.01 -0.07 0.21 0.11 0.04 0.24 0.83 0.21 0.47
t -0.89 -1.46 0.52 -0.03 -0.45 1.55 0.49 0.30 1.94 0.85 0.29 1.29
Nobs. 127 126 392 118 117 364 55 55 169 21 21 68
Freedom of trade 0 . 0 6 - 0 . 0 90 . 0 00 . 0 5 - 0 . 1 6 - 0 . 0 10 . 8 30 . 2 60 . 3 90 . 7 70 . 1 90 . 5 1
t 0 . 1 8 - 0 . 3 50 . 0 30 . 1 1 - 0 . 5 7 - 0 . 0 42 . 5 21 . 2 02 . 1 61 . 8 50 . 6 51 . 4 5
Nobs. 126 125 385 117 116 358 55 55 169 21 21 68
Labour market regulations 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.18 -0.30 -0.10 0.03 -0.99 -0.52 0.05
t 1.11 1.43 1.62 0.95 1.41 1.82 -0.69 -0.29 0.18 -1.35 -0.73 0.19
Nobs. 77 76 265 77 76 256 45 45 133 18 18 56
Business regulations 0.10 -0.01 -0.04 0.07 -0.02 0.13 -0.24 -0.14 0.07 0.11 -0.65 0.36
t 0.42 -0.03 -0.25 0.29 -0.10 0.71 -0.78 -0.68 0.33 0.15 -1.76 0.75
Nobs. 72 71 256 72 71 247 40 40 124 13 13 47
Economic freedom index -0.19 -0.25 0.17 -0.14 -0.19 0.23 -0.17 -0.05 0.34 0.83 -0.24 0.87
t -0.62 -1.03 0.87 -0.44 -0.76 1.16 -0.60 -0.28 1.67 1.33 -1.23 1.88
Nobs. 121 120 380 112 111 352 49 49 157 15 15 56
All countries
Countries with 
population above 1 
million
Middle income 
countries with 
population above 1 
million
CEECCA 
countries
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Mean tariff rate -0.03 -0.15 -0.02 -0.08 -0.21 -0.02 0.27 0.00 0.12 0.94 -0.19 0.49
t -0.26 -1.39 -0.22 -0.70 -2.34 -0.21 1.41 -0.02 0.89 1.78 -1.02 0.85
Nobs. 109 108 343 102 101 322 48 48 150 14 14 50
Hidden barriers -0.16 -0.22 0.10 -0.06 -0.13 0.14 -0.06 -0.08 0.00 0.10 -0.24 -0.05
t -1.18 -2.03 1.05 -0.49 -1.39 1.40 -0.37 -1.07 0.01 0.21 -1.07 -0.17
Nobs. 75 74 248 74 73 238 41 41 127 13 13 47
Share of fuel exports 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.08
t 3.42 3.82 4.12 2.59 3.02 2.92 1.66 2.17 2.10 5.76 5.21 3.33
Nobs. 159 158 405 131 130 341 64 64 167 28 28 69
Share of food exports -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08
t -4.12 -3.14 -2.26 -3.44 -2.27 -2.21 -2.34 -1.66 -1.88 -2.17 -2.16 -2.73
Nobs. 152 151 409 127 126 342 61 61 164 27 27 68
Stock of private sector credit/GDP -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06
t -1.88 -1.49 -1.94 -1.63 -1.42 -2.45 -1.88 -1.49 -1.94 -1.21 -0.88 -2.80
Nobs. 63 63 182 137 136 399 63 63 182 27 27 76
Stock of FDI/GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.07
t -0.95 -1.38 -0.09 -0.44 -0.34 -0.15 1.54 1.15 2.11 3.12 1.96 2.28
Nobs. 173 172 514 144 143 428 65 65 194 29 29 85
Contemporaneous correlates
Inflation 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02
t 1.39 2.30 -0.56 1.10 1.73 -0.53 0.17 0.19 -2.51 -0.67 -0.12 -2.01
Nobs. 178 177 530 146 145 435 66 66 198 30 30 89
Fiscal balance/GDP 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.36 0.18 0.20
t 1.97 2.56 2.93 1.73 2.42 3.38 1.39 1.87 2.94 2.38 1.11 1.97
Nobs. 159 158 456 141 140 409 66 66 195 30 30 90
Investment/GDP 0.15 0.09 0.21 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.21 0.09 0.11 0.38 0.18 0.16
t 2.51 2.28 2.80 2.74 1.75 3.75 2.39 1.10 2.47 3.70 1.46 2.13
Nobs. 172 173 501 144 144 427 66 66 198 30 30 90
Trade opennes 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
t 1.84 0.96 1.71 2.72 1.56 2.34 2.81 1.81 2.44 1.22 0.93 1.06
Nobs. 173 172 515 144 143 429 66 66 198 29 29 87
Terms of trade 0.21 0.29 0.27 0.13 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.17 0.05 0.48 0.53 0.15
t 2.85 3.60 1.83 2.14 2.97 1.90 0.92 1.74 0.75 2.98 2.54 0.65
Nobs. 161 160 451 140 139 403 66 66 191 30 30 90
Growth in credit to private sector/GDP 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.00
t 3.59 1.73 1.51 5.02 2.23 2.81 3.59 1.73 1.51 0.43 -0.47 0.01
Nobs. 58 62 180 116 135 390 58 62 180 26 27 76
FDI inflows/GDP 0.17 0.09 0.16 0.30 0.19 0.13 0.33 0.23 0.04 0.36 0.28 -0.05
t 1.98 1.64 1.86 5.17 4.07 2.74 2.28 1.79 0.42 1.72 1.57 -0.36
Nobs. 177 176 526 146 145 434 66 66 198 29 29 87
Remmittances inflows/GDP -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 0.10 -0.12 -0.07 0.17
t -2.53 -3.55 -1.61 -5.01 -4.70 -0.23 -1.22 -0.96 0.94 -1.73 -1.09 1.03
Nobs. 158 156 464 132 130 389 62 62 185 27 27 81
R&D expenditures/GDP -0.12 -0.12 -0.07 -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 -0.12 -0.10 -0.06 -0.18 -0.14 -0.08
t -6.05 -4.64 -2.68 -6.49 -5.39 -2.62 -5.76 -4.94 -1.86 -7.98 -6.74 -1.54
Nobs. 105 104 292 98 97 275 52 52 152 24 24 72
Patents/population -0.38 -0.42 -0.48 -0.16 -0.19 -0.29 0.94 0.61 0.60 9.02 8.11 -5.53
t -1.10 -1.42 -2.49 -0.51 -0.79 -1.50 2.11 2.22 1.85 1.04 1.23 -0.60
Nobs. 95 89 267 89 83 254 51 49 148 27 27 80 
Note. CS: cross section. P: panel with three non-overlapping 5-year long periods between 1995 and 2010. 
Dependent variable: average annualised (compounded) real GDP growth. Constant and initial GDP per capita at 
PPP are always included, as well as period fixed effects for the panels.  
 
3. How much does the crisis alter the within-sample fit of cross-country growth 
regressions? 
Following the model specification steps discussed in the previous section, we ran the 715 
cross-country growth regressions for our third country sample (66 middle-income countries 
with population above 1 million). Figure 2 shows actual average GDP growth and the 
distribution of the in-sample fit derived from the 715 regressions. The distribution is 
presented in the form of a box-plot (see the note to the figure for details). Two sample periods   12
are shown: the sample covering the pre-crisis ‘boom years’ only (2000-07) and the sample 
which also includes the bust (2000-10). 
 
The main message of the figure is the downward revision of both actual growth and fitted 
values of growth from the regressions. For most countries the downward revision is between 
one and three percent per year. In some cases, actual growth fits well with the distribution of 
the 715 estimates, but there are outliers. We would like to highlight, however, that the goal 
was not find a perfect fit for all countries but to estimate models that can be used to assess the 
‘potential’ rate of growth. 
 
For example, in the cases of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, actual growth was well above the 
distribution of estimates in the 2000-07 period. When extending the sample, however, the 
actual growth of Estonia and Latvia fall within the interquartile range of the distribution of 
715 fitted values of growth from the regressions and is close to the range in the case of 
Lithuania. Consequently, our calculations indicate that the three Baltic countries grew above 
potential in the pre-crisis period (this has likely contributed to the huge current-account 
deficits of these countries), but considering the whole 2000s, average growth may not have 
been far from potential. 
 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and, to a lesser extent, Armenia provide a different example. For 
these countries, actual growth was above the fitted values of growth from all models, not just 
in the pre-crisis period but in the whole 2000s as well. The first two of these countries are 
major hydrocarbon exporters. Even though our models controlled for the terms of trade and 
the share of fuel exports in total exports, our models do not match the reality in these 
countries. 
 
Hungary presents a different picture since actual growth is below the level of growth 
predicted by the model in both sample periods. This finding could be explained by the fact 
that GDP growth had already slowed down in the mid-2000s partly due to domestic policies 
(fiscal austerity to eliminate the nearly double digit – as a percentage of GDP – budget deficit 
of 2002-06), and partly due to structural weaknesses. The country may have therefore grown 
below potential already before the crisis.   
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Figure 2: The effect of the crisis on in-sample fit from 715 growth regressions: cross 
section estimates for 2001-07 and for 2001-10 
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Note. Red dots: actual annualised (compounded) GDP growth over the five-year period. The box-plots show the 
empirical distribution of the in-sample fit of 715 regressions. The dependent variable is the average (annualised) 
real GDP growth (in percent) during the period shown on the horizontal axis. All regressions include the initial 
GDP per capita at PPP compared to the US and three regional dummies (10 new EU member states; six western 
Balkan countries; 12 CIS countries) as explanatory variables. The 715 regressions comprise all possible quartets 
of the remaining thirteen explanatory variables.   14
The box-plot represents the distribution of the fits (point estimates) derived from the regressions. The box 
portion of a box-plot represents the first and third quartiles (middle 50 percent of the estimates), the median is 
depicted using an orange line through the centre of the box, while the mean is drawn using a green circle. The 
whiskers and staples ('error bars') show the values that are outside the first and third quartiles, but within 1.5 
times the interquartile range (ie 1.5 times the difference between first and third quartiles). Outliers, if any, are 
indicated with separate symbols outside the staples. Box widths are proportional to the sample size (number of 
available regression). 
 
4. How large is the EU accession ‘growth dividend’? 
EU accession can (1) directly improve the fundamentals that drive economic growth, such as 
higher capital inflows, higher trade flows, a better legal environment, etc, but (2) can also 
have a ‘growth dividend’ beyond the effects of enlargement on the fundamental determinants 
of growth. This dividend can be due to, for example, enhanced credibility, which is not 
captured by any other variable included in the model. To our knowledge, earlier papers that 
have adopted growth regressions have only considered this second factor using dummy 
variable approaches, which we also use in Section 4.1. But in Section 4.2 we consider as well 
the first factor using a counterfactual simulation. 
 
4.1 Dummy variable approach 
It is a common practice to include regional dummies in cross-country growth regressions. 
When the estimated parameter of such a dummy is significantly larger then zero, one may 
argue that the country group under consideration grew faster than what would have been 
implied by the countries' fundamental growth determinants, ie the country group is different 
from the rest of world in a sense. For example, the European Commission (2009) reports the 
result, based on the detailed analysis of Böwer and Turrini (2010),  that EU enlargement 
contributed to 1.75 percent excess annual growth (in every year between 2000 and 2008) of 
CEE10 countries beyond the effects of enlargement on the fundamental determinants of 
growth. This result was achieved with a panel regression in which a dummy variable was 
added to the growth performance of the CEE10 states for the 2000-08 period
14. Regarding 
CIS countries, Åslund and Jenish (2006) found that these countries had exhibited 
extraordinary growth performances since 2000. As we have argued, these and all other 
estimates for sample periods ending before the crisis are likely biased upwards, because they 
were based on the period of fast growth covering only the boom part of the 2000s, which 
proved to be unsustainable for many CEECCA countries. We now study the impact of the 
sample period on the results. 
 
                                                 
14 The sample period of Böwer and Turrini (2010) covers actual data till 2007 and the spring 2008 forecast for 
2008.   15
To start, we estimated our 715 regressions as pure cross-section models for growth from 2000 
till 2007 (ie pre-crisis sample) and for a longer period ending in 2010 that also includes the 
impact of the crisis. Figure 3 plots the distribution of the parameter estimates of three regional 
dummies of CEECCA countries. The estimated parameter of the dummy for the new EU 
member states is found to be positive in the pre-crisis period (and even the 1.75 percentage 
point estimate of the European Commission (2009) and Böwer and Turrini (2010) fits well 
within the distribution), but considering the whole 2000s, the parameter estimates of the 
dummy are much lower. Both the mean and the median of the 715 estimates are positive and 
correspond to a 0.3-0.4 percent annual ‘growth dividend’, but zero is included in the 
interquartile range.  
 
Regarding the CIS countries, the figure suggests that their growth rate was indeed higher than 
what would have predicted by fundamentals, considering both the pre-crisis period and the 
full sample, though the estimates are somewhat lower in the full period. The dummy 
representing western Balkan countries has mostly positive parameter estimates but zero lies 
within the distribution.  
 
Figure 3: Distribution of the parameter estimates of the regional dummies from 715 
cross section regressions: comparison of the 2000-07 and 2000-10 samples 
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Note. The figure shows the empirical distribution of the parameter estimates of the three regional dummies from 
715 different regressions in the form of box-plots. See the note to Figure 2 on the interpretation of the box-plot. 
 
To further test the time profile of country group dummies, we estimated the models in a panel 
setup (with five-year non-overlapping periods) and allowed the parameter of the country 
group dummy to change over time. Results are shown in Figure 4. The new EU member   16
states grew above their fundamentals from 2000 to 2005 and below from 2005 to 2010. The 
magnitudes are similar to our previous estimates: the excess growth in 2001-05 was estimated 
to be around 1.5-1.8 percent per year (considering the interquartile range of the distribution of 
the estimated parameters), which is again very much in line with the findings of the European 
Commission (2009). During the second half of the 2000s, however, the growth performance 
of this country group is worse than in other countries of the world (controlling for 
fundamentals); hence, during the 2000s overall, the new member states do not differ from 
other countries. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the western Balkan countries, while the 
CIS countries still grew faster than what was explained by the models during the 2000s, 
though their advantage has declined.  
 
Figure 4: Distribution of the parameter estimates of the region dummies in four time 
periods 
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Note. The figure shows the empirical distribution of the parameter estimates of the three regional dummies 
(included as four separate dummy variables for the four sample periods). See the note to Figure 2 on the 
interpretation of the box-plot. 
 
5.2 Counterfactual simulation 
We use another different approach to assess the growth dividend of EU accession. We set up a 
counterfactual scenario for the fundamentals under which no EU enlargement occurred, 
basing the scenario on the development of non-EU middle income countries. Among the 13 
variables selected in Section 3, eight have likely been affected by EU accession: inflow of 
FDI, stock of FDI, credit to the private sector, foreign trade, investment, fiscal balance, 
freedom-of-trade index and the index for legal systems and property rights. We assume that 
EU accession did not have an effect on four variables: secondary school enrolment, 
dependency rate, share of fuel exports and the terms of trade. The thirteenth variable, GDP 
historical gap, is affected indirectly by GDP growth. 
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We have set up the counterfactual scenario for the fundamentals based on the development of 
44 non-EU middle income countries
15. To this end, we calculated the country-group average 
of the eight variables for the CEE10 and for the control group and assumed under the 
hypothesis of no EU enlargement that the change in the variables of the CEE10 compared to 
their pre-2000 values would have been identical to the change in the same variables of the 
control group. Figure 5 shows, for the group averages, the actual developments in CEE10 
(blue line), the actual developments in the control group (green line), and the counterfactual 
scenario for the CEE10 (red line). The assumed impact of EU enlargement on these 
fundamentals is shown by the difference between the blue and red lines. We applied these 
average impacts to each individual CEE10 countries. 
 
For example, in the counterfactual scenario under which no EU enlargement occurred, FDI 
inflow/GDP would have been 5.3 percent instead of 5.9 percent in 2001-05 and 5.8 percent 
instead of 6.2 percent in 2006-10. The figure suggests that for five of the eight variables, EU 
accession has clearly led to growth-enhancing development of the fundamentals (ie the blue 
line is above the red line). The index for legal systems and property rights would have been 
broadly similar under the counterfactual scenario. It is only the fiscal balance that would have 
been better under the counterfactual scenario.  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 The income thresholds we applied were defined in Section 2. We did not include the four EU15 countries 
falling within the thresholds (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). The 44 countries are: Albania, Algeria, 
Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Lebanon, 
Libya, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, New Zealand, Oman, Panama, Peru, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Serbia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela.   18
Figure 5: Counterfactual scenario for eight variables of the CEE10 countries under no 
EU accession  
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Source: Author’s calculations. See details in the main text. 
Note. We assumed that EU accession had an impact on the development of variables after 2000. Consequently, 
for contemporaneous correlates the counterfactual scenario differs from the actual data during 2001-05 and 
2006-10, while for initial conditions the 2005 values are different. 
 
We then use the estimated models to simulate the growth effects of the incremental 
improvement of fundamentals due to EU enlargement. To this end, we run two simulations 
for all 715 models and calculated the difference between the two simulations. The first 
simulation uses actual data for all variables, while the second simulation uses the 
counterfactual values of the eight variables, as discussed above, and actual data for the other 
variables. We used the models estimated in the form of panel regressions, covering three non-
overlapping five-year periods between 1995 and 2010. As the estimated parameter of the 
CEE10 dummy for 2000-10 did not prove to be significant, we did not include it in the model. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of the results. Both the mean and the median are 0.11 
percentage point for 2001-05 and 0.15 percentage point for 2006-10, but zero is included in 
the interquartile range, though close to its boundary. 
   19
Table 2: The growth effects of the incremental improvement of fundamentals in the 
CEE10 states due to EU enlargement (percent)  
  2001-2005 2006-2010 
Max 0.68 0.88 
Upper 25%  0.21  0.33 
Mean 0.11  0.15 
Median 0.11  0.15 
Lower 25%  -0.01  -0.01 
Min -0.26  -0.52 
Note. Values show the distribution of 715 estimates for the effects of the incremental improvement of 
fundamentals due to EU enlargement on annual real GDP growth, which were derived as the difference between 
two scenarios: one using actual data and one using counterfactual values for eight variables under the hypothesis 
of no EU enlargement for the CEE10 states. See details in the main text. 
 
Taken together, the results of the dummy variable approach and the counterfactual simulation 
approach show a positive impact of EU enlargement on growth in the CEE10 states, 
considering even the full decade of the 2000s, but the results are much smaller than previous 
research has found for the pre-crisis sample and are generally not significant. The dummy 
variable approach (which measures the impact of EU enlargement above the impact of EU 
enlargement on fundaments) suggested a point estimate around 0.3-0.4 percent per year, while 
the counterfactual simulation (which measures the impact of EU enlargement through better 
fundamentals) suggested 0.15 percent per year in the second half of the 2000s. 
 
5. Post-crisis growth prospects 
Finally, we study prospects for post-crisis growth using our estimated models and by setting 
up hypothetical scenarios for the future development of growth drivers. To this end, we use 
the models estimated in a panel regression form, consisting of non-overlapping five-year 
intervals between 1995 and 2010 in order to include all major emerging-market crisis 
episodes of recent years. The models are estimated for the country sample comprising middle 
income countries with population of more than 1 million.  
 
Based on the findings discussed in the previous section, we allow a country group dummy 
variable only for the CIS group in our estimated models. Since the parameter of the period 
CIS dummy declined in the second half of the 2000s and we do not want to pick this last 
estimate (because it may be sensitive to the effects of the crisis), we include a single CIS 
dummy for the whole 1995-2010 period. 
 
For the projections, we have set up three scenarios (optimistic, pessimistic and an interim) for 
2011-15, and we analyse possible growth trajectories. For the optimistic scenario, we assume   20
that pre-crisis developments will resume, ie for most variables the average changes from 2000 
to 2007 are extrapolated using the 2010 starting values. For the pessimistic scenario, we 
assume that capital inflows will be permanently reduced, foreign trade and domestic credit 
will expand only in line with GDP, the investment rate will stabilise at a low level and the 
budget balance will not improve after 2010. Table 3 details the assumptions behind these two 
scenarios. For the interim scenario, we assume that the key variables take the simple average 
of their values in the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. The period fixed effects (which are 
included in the panel regression) are assumed to be zero for 2011-15. 
 
It is important to note that for different countries the suggested scenarios may have specific 
upside and downside risks. For example, for the Czech Republic, Poland or Slovakia, there 
seem to be upside risks in the interim scenario, given that these countries did not experience 
unsustainable bubbles before the crisis and therefore the optimistic scenario seems to be the 
realistic one. However, for some other countries, especially for the fixed exchange rate regime 
countries and Romania, there are downside risks in the interim scenario, because it would be 
unrealistic to expect that unsustainable pre-crisis developments could return, particularly as 
regards credit growth and the related inflows of foreign capital. In fact, given these countries’ 
weak competitive positions, high private debt, and low policy credibility (with perhaps the 
exception of Estonia, which joins the euro area in 2011), the pessimistic scenario may be the 
realistic one with perhaps even further downside risks. 
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Table 3. Detailed assumptions of the scenarios 
  Optimistic scenario   Pessimistic scenario 
Initial conditions (same for all scenarios) 
GDP per capita at PPP 
compared to the US in 2010 
IMF WEO April 2010 forecast 
GDP historical gap in 2010  Calculated on the basis of IMF WEO April 2010 forecast 
Dependency rate in 2010  Linear projection from the latest actual data (2008) assuming that the 
trend of the previous three years continues  
Secondary school enrolment in 
2010 
Latest available data (typically 2007 or 2008) 
Share of fuel exports in total 
exports in 2010 
Latest available data (2008) 
 
Stock of inward FDI relative to 
GDP in 2010 
Calculated on the basis of IMF WEO April 2010 forecast 
 
Freedom of trade index in 2010  Latest available data (2008) 
 
Index for legal system & 
property rights in 2010 
Latest available data (2008) 
Contemporaneous correlates 
fiscal balance/GDP in 2011-2015  Budget balance is achieved by 
2020 with the same improvement 
in every year till then 
The ratio stays constant at 2010 
forecast level 
investment/GDP  Average ratio between 2001 and 
2007 (or 2010 level if higher) 
The ratio stays constant at 2010 
forecast level 
exports plus imports/GDP  Average annual increase between 
2001 and 2007 resumes from 
2011* 
The ratio stays constant at 2010 
forecast level 
terms of trade  No change  No change 
credit to private sector/GDP  Average annual increase between 
2001 and 2007 is resumed from 
2011 
The ratio stays constant at 2010 
forecast level 
FDI inflow/GDP  Average ratio between 2001 and 
2007 
The ratio stays constant at 2010 
forecast level 
Note. The interim scenario assumes the average of the values for the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios.  
* Average annual increase between 2001 and 2006 for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, since the trade/GDP ratio 
already fell in these countries in 2007. 
 
 
Before presenting the results of the scenarios, it is important to highlight the potential 
implications of the recent negative output gaps. Figure 6 provides a schematic picture of 
actual and potential output before, during and after the crisis. The overheated economies in 
many CEECCA countries (see, eg Bruegel and WIIW, 2010) have led to faster actual output 
growth than potential growth before the crisis, and hence the actual output level has become 
greater than potential output. Cerra and Saxena (2008) have demonstrated that crises tend to 
generate a sizeable permanent loss in the level of output compared with the pre-crisis trend, 
and therefore the level of potential output in CEECCA countries is likely to have fallen during 
the recent crisis. As OECD (2010) emphasises, a crisis can impact all three major factors of 
production (capital, labour, productivity) and thereby can lead to a fall in potential output. 
First, lower capital stock is expected due to foregone investment and the higher cost of capital 
can negatively affect capital deepening and hence output per employee. Second, 
unemployment hysteresis can affect both equilibrium unemployment and labour force   22
participation. Third, reductions in total factor productivity (TFP) can result from sectoral 
reallocations from high-to low-productivity sectors, skill mismatches and lower research and 
development expenditures. 
 
But it is also likely, in line with theory and empirical research, that actual output falls below 
potential GDP, ie the output gap becomes negative after the crisis. European Commission 
(2010) estimates that the 2010 output gap in the new EU member states ranges from -10.7 in 
Latvia to -2.1 in Poland. The growth scenarios we present consider the slope of potential 
output, but do not consider the possible growth-enhancing impact of closing the negative 
output gaps. 
 
Figure 6: Schematic depiction of actual and potential output 
 
We also note that variables related to vulnerabilities, such as the current account balance, 
external debt, or inflation, are not included in the regression because of the difficulties in 
addressing modeling issues related to causality, time profile and functional form
16. Instead, 
our models can be interpreted as being conditioned on the average macroeconomic stability of 
the countries included in the panel. Since our panel regression includes 66 middle income 
countries, which on average had better macroeconomic stability than those CEECCA 
countries that experienced unsustainable developments, our projections can also be interpreted 
as being conditional on the achievement of this average macroeconomic stability. This factor 
provides an additional downside risk (even compared to our pessimistic scenario) for 
countries such as Bulgaria and Latvia. 
 
                                                 
16 For example, during the pre-crisis boom, rapid economic growth was accompanied by growing internal and 
external vulnerabilities in several CEECCA countries, which would suggest a perverse relationship between 
vulnerabilities and economic growth. 
Potential output
Actual output   23
Figure 7 shows the distribution of fitted values of growth rates from the regressions for 1996-
2010 and the results of the interim scenario projections for 2011-15
17. When interpreting the 
figure, note that, similar to the in-sample fit presented in section 3, the aim was not to find a 
perfect fit to historical growth, but to estimate models that can capture potential growth. Note 
also that these countries experienced very sharp GDP contractions in the first half of the 
1990s, and some above-potential growth after this period therefore may be regarded as a 
natural development. For example, according to our results, the three Baltic countries had 
already experienced above-potential growth rates in 1996-2000, but especially in 2001-05. As 
we know, this period (and also the first two years of the next five-year period as well) resulted 
in huge current-account imbalances and the build-up of massive external debt that proved to 
be unsustainable, and a deep recession followed. The cumulative growth rates from 2005 to 
2010 fell close to zero in the Baltics
18.  
 
Our results are easily explained for most of the countries. The key exceptions are Azerbaijan 
and Turkmenistan, two oil exporters, for which actual growth before the crisis turned out to be 
much higher than fitted by our model. Although the terms of trade and the share of fuel 
exports in total exports are included in our models, it seems that none of the models could 
capture the past growth processes in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Armenia also had 
extremely rapid growth in 2001-05 that our models cannot explain. Macedonia (Former 
Yugoslav Republic) had a disappointing growth performance in 2001-05, which was not just 
below the fitted values of growth from our regressions, but was also below the growth rates of 
all other countries of the region. Therefore domestic factors, which are not included in our 
model, were presumably responsible for this. Considering the 2006-10 period, there are four 
countries (apart from some oil exporting CIS countries) that grew faster than our model 
predictions: Albania, Mongolia, Poland and Slovakia. These countries were generally less 
impacted by the crisis. For most of the other countries, actual growth is either in line with our 
model, or the boom of the early 2000s and the bust of the late 2000s are well interpretable.  
 
Table 4 shows, for three scenarios, the mean growth projection of the 715 models and their 95 
percent range. The results suggest that even in the optimistic scenario – which assumes a 
return to the pre-crisis development of fundamentals and, in particular, to country-specific 
pre-crisis capital inflows, credit growth and trade deepening – medium-term outlooks are well 
                                                 
17 Note also that each individual fit and projection has its own confidence band.  
18 Note that this close to zero cumulative growth from 2005 to 2010 is the product of high growth in 2006 and 
2007 and a deep contraction from 2007 to 2010.   24
below pre-crisis actual growth, especially in those countries that experienced substantial 
credit and consumption booms. But medium term outlook is also below (with the sole 
exception of the Kyrgyz Republic) potential growth in 2000-05.  
 
This finding is mainly the result of three effects. First, part of pre-crisis economic growth has 
likely led to the development of positive output gaps, while our models project potential 
growth and implicitly assume that the output gap will be zero. Second, the crisis has altered 
the estimated parameters of the models, and the full-sample estimate associates less benign 
effects with capital inflows. Third, all countries could achieve economic catching up toward 
the EU15 level considering the full period of 2001-10, which reduces conditional 
convergence-driven future growth. However, actual growth rates might exceed potential 
growth rates in the coming years, as negative output gaps are diminishing. This effect could, 
at least in part, compensate for the reduction in potential growth in the next few years. 
 
There are only a few exceptions, where projected growth broadly equals average actual 
growth in 2001-05 or it is even higher: Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic), Mongolia, Poland and Uzbekistan. Regarding 
Poland, actual growth may have been below potential growth in 2001-05, partly due to the 
aggressive anti-inflationary monetary policy that was adopted around that time. Actual growth 
has indeed accelerated in 2006-10, and therefore the relatively slow projected growth rate (on 
average, 3.27 percent per year in the optimistic scenario, which we argue is realistic for 
Poland among our three scenarios) may seem surprising. But Poland’s fundamentals are not 
outstanding. For example, the investment rate is considerably lower than in most other CEE10 
countries and the budget deficit is quite large in 2010 (more than seven percent of GDP), 
which will require more serious efforts to consolidate than in most other countries. Also, as 
Veugelers (2010) and Darvas (2010) highlight, Poland has some low scores in some important 
indicators corresponding to framework conditions of growth, such as infrastructure or the 
quality of the educational system.  
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Figure 7: Actual GDP growth and fitted values of growth from 715 regressions for 1996-
2010 and projections (interim scenario) for 2011-15 
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Note. Red colour line: actual annualised (compounded) GDP growth over the five-year period. The box-plot 
shows the distribution of the 715 fits; see the note to Figure 2 on the interpretation of the box-plot. Montenegro 
is not included due to a lack of sufficient data for estimation. Note that the projections for 2011-15 consider the 
growth rate of potential output, but not the correction of the negative output gap that likely characterised all 
countries in 2010 (see Figure 6 and the discussion around it). 
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Table 4: Average annual actual and potential growth: in-sample fit and projections  
1990-95 
Actual Fit Actual Fit Actual Fit Actual pessimistic interim optimistic
Bulgaria 2.24 4.65 3.33 3.68 3.76 3.82 -0.89
-7.30 3.31 -0.56 5.26 5.28 4.03 2.63 4.74 4.83 4.91 -0.43
4.33 5.87 4.74 6.45 6.55 6.63 0.68
Czech Republic 2.57 3.41 1.59 1.99 2.03 2.06 -1.38
-1.13 3.09 1.48 4.20 3.74 2.50 2.48 2.96 3.06 3.17 -1.13
3.67 4.94 3.19 4.11 4.16 4.29 -0.78
Estonia 3.49 4.55 2.50 3.17 3.27 3.32 -1.28
-7.44 4.26 6.68 5.32 7.93 3.58 -0.31 4.15 4.30 4.45 -1.02
5.06 6.24 4.76 5.63 5.77 5.98 -0.47
Hungary 3.03 3.91 2.16 2.87 2.98 3.05 -0.93
-1.99 3.56 4.02 4.55 4.30 2.85 -0.24 3.47 3.56 3.64 -0.99
4.11 5.17 3.65 4.22 4.27 4.30 -0.91
Latvia 3.36 4.52 2.85 3.04 3.40 3.64 -1.12
-12.06 3.93 5.42 5.06 8.19 3.26 -1.49 3.76 3.99 4.21 -1.07
4.57 5.62 3.75 4.64 4.71 5.12 -0.92
Lithuania 2.93 4.46 2.72 2.66 3.09 3.41 -1.36
-10.68 3.64 4.68 4.90 7.82 3.13 0.36 3.51 3.69 3.88 -1.21
4.47 5.69 3.72 4.31 4.37 4.50 -1.31
Poland 2.87 3.91 2.47 2.57 2.69 2.75 -1.21
2.14 3.40 5.41 4.30 3.08 2.83 4.47 3.12 3.19 3.27 -1.11
4.04 4.70 3.24 3.83 3.89 3.97 -0.81
Romania 2.79 4.39 2.87 3.15 3.40 3.51 -0.98
-2.13 3.39 -1.26 4.95 5.74 3.38 2.87 3.92 4.02 4.11 -0.93
4.33 5.47 3.96 4.73 4.76 4.97 -0.70
Slovakia 2.70 3.88 2.45 2.28 2.39 2.48 -1.50
-2.91 3.55 3.30 4.62 4.93 3.15 4.80 3.23 3.34 3.44 -1.28
4.46 5.38 3.86 4.18 4.23 4.30 -1.15
Slovenia 2.46 3.05 1.16 1.51 1.60 1.65 -1.45
-0.60 2.87 4.39 3.59 3.63 1.89 1.85 2.26 2.38 2.50 -1.21
3.32 4.04 2.51 3.01 3.08 3.21 -0.96
Albania 2.62 3.85 2.66 3.72 3.88 3.96 0.03
-2.69 3.52 5.46 4.94 5.88 3.65 4.86 4.46 4.53 4.60 -0.41
4.44 5.78 4.53 5.43 5.44 5.50 -0.34
Bosnia & Herzegovina 4.33 4.91 2.96 3.35 3.47 3.52 -1.44
-26.65 5.36 29.52 5.48 4.46 3.77 2.99 4.48 4.56 4.63 -0.93
6.22 6.26 4.58 5.58 5.64 5.66 -0.62
Croatia 2.49 3.80 2.53 3.00 3.07 3.12 -0.73
-6.26 3.09 3.41 4.36 4.78 2.90 1.30 3.52 3.58 3.63 -0.78
3.85 4.77 3.30 4.32 4.37 4.42 -0.41
Macedonia FYR 2.95 4.42 2.82 3.55 3.60 3.64 -0.82
-4.67 3.71 2.95 4.97 1.41 3.63 3.15 4.30 4.35 4.40 -0.61
4.66 5.66 4.35 5.29 5.31 5.32 -0.35
Montenegro
-10.76 3.06 2.81 3.27
Serbia 2.67 3.55 2.40 2.90 2.97 3.03 -0.58
-13.67 3.44 2.57 4.46 5.19 3.13 3.29 3.78 3.84 3.91 -0.62
4.54 5.23 3.68 4.63 4.64 4.68 -0.59
Turkey 2.67 3.51 2.31 2.76 2.85 2.95 -0.66
3.21 3.27 4.12 4.19 4.55 2.93 2.45 3.28 3.35 3.43 -0.84
3.88 4.75 3.58 3.94 3.96 4.07 -0.78
Armenia 4.18 6.01 4.50 4.92 4.99 5.04 -1.02
-13.03 5.03 5.15 7.03 12.25 5.82 3.68 6.55 6.60 6.65 -0.44
5.89 8.12 7.07 8.16 8.17 8.23 0.05
Azerbaijan 4.85 6.40 4.06 3.34 4.14 4.67 -2.27
-16.21 5.80 6.97 8.49 11.78 5.96 15.89 5.65 6.09 6.53 -2.40
6.72 10.28 7.98 8.68 8.72 8.91 -1.55
Belarus 5.38 6.33 4.91 5.47 5.51 5.51 -0.83
-8.36 5.75 6.32 7.05 7.89 5.72 6.17 5.94 5.97 6.00 -1.08
6.19 7.76 6.42 6.82 6.82 6.84 -0.94
Georgia 4.42 5.64 4.45 5.13 5.39 5.55 -0.25
-22.34 5.06 5.70 7.02 7.32 5.49 4.25 6.33 6.46 6.60 -0.56
6.02 8.26 6.50 7.96 8.01 8.06 -0.25
Kazakhstan 4.10 6.46 4.81 4.80 4.98 5.17 -1.48
-9.30 5.12 2.48 7.43 10.37 5.80 5.21 6.15 6.21 6.28 -1.22
5.93 8.82 7.07 7.49 7.52 7.59 -1.30
Kyrgyz Republic 4.09 5.48 4.33 5.09 5.36 5.59 -0.12
-12.20 4.99 5.60 6.40 3.78 5.60 5.35 6.41 6.51 6.61 0.11
5.97 7.39 6.86 7.58 7.61 7.71 0.22
Moldova 4.46 6.02 4.78 5.13 5.34 5.45 -0.69
-16.71 5.42 -2.48 7.21 7.08 5.83 2.20 6.41 6.52 6.64 -0.69
6.48 8.52 6.80 7.79 7.84 7.90 -0.68
Mongolia 2.92 5.05 3.86 4.14 4.43 4.64 -0.62
-2.80 4.20 3.40 5.74 5.91 4.73 6.57 5.55 5.64 5.74 -0.10
5.38 6.59 6.20 7.87 7.87 7.88 1.28
Russia 3.36 5.12 3.56 3.57 3.66 3.74 -1.46
-9.11 4.00 1.62 6.31 6.13 4.74 3.31 4.91 4.96 5.02 -1.35
4.89 7.57 5.73 6.25 6.27 6.31 -1.30
Tajikistan 3.90 5.23 4.18 5.65 5.63 5.63 0.40
-16.61 5.12 2.84 6.93 9.35 5.71 6.00 6.61 6.67 6.74 -0.25
6.37 8.36 6.96 7.45 7.51 7.57 -0.85
Turkmenistan 5.50 6.49 3.85 4.88 4.72 4.72 -1.77
-9.02 6.88 4.06 7.32 16.17 5.74 9.89 6.26 6.27 6.23 -1.05
8.49 8.10 7.36 7.78 8.04 8.27 -0.06
Ukraine 4.15 5.65 4.21 4.28 4.63 4.84 -1.01
-13.64 5.04 -2.00 6.79 7.69 5.17 0.80 5.72 5.86 6.01 -0.92
5.88 8.08 6.17 7.06 7.08 7.13 -1.01
Uzbekistan 4.69 5.85 4.84 5.91 5.75 5.81 -0.10
-4.11 5.68 3.31 7.03 5.41 5.80 8.38 6.72 6.81 6.84 -0.22
6.74 8.19 6.85 7.66 7.94 7.94 -0.25
Revision of 2011-15 
projection (interim 
scenario) compared 
to 2001-05 fit
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Note: the mean (numbers in bold) and the 95 percent range are shown for the fitted values and the projections. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we used cross country growth regressions to study the impact of the 2008/09 
global financial and economic crisis on economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
Caucasus and Central Asia (CEECCA). We argued that results of previous related works that 
used sample periods that ended before the crisis might be misleading, because these papers 
obviously did not cover the bust phase of the economic cycle of the 2000s. However, using 
data only from the boom years, which led to unsustainable credit, housing and consumption 
booms in many CEECCA countries (but not in most other emerging and developing 
countries), might not be useful for forming longer-term perspectives. We extended the sample 
period until 2010, relying mostly on the April 2010 forecast of the IMF and the July 2010 
forecast of the EIU, and used this extended sample for estimation in order to better capture 
both phases of the economic cycle. Even though forecasts for 2010 are uncertain and the 
crisis-period hardly represents a standard bust phase of a business cycle, including it in the 
sample period is inevitable and the addition of forecasts for 2010 might not distort the results 
much. 
 
We ran cross-country growth regressions on the post-1995 sample period to minimise the 
chance of structural breaks and adopted three different sample periods (1995-2010, 2000-07, 
2000-10). To analyse the robustness of the results, we studied four different country samples 
and used various explanatory variables. We selected those possible growth determinants and 
correlates that significantly correlated with growth, controlling for the initial GDP per capita 
level and period-fixed effects, and checked that the results were robust both to the different 
time periods and to the different country groups used to estimate the panels. Among the 
variables that had a significant and correctly-signed partial correlation coefficient with 
growth, we selected 13 that represented different kinds of growth drivers and correlates. Due 
to the difficulties of selecting a single model, we estimated many models and combined them. 
We estimated models with all 715 possible quartets (ie four-element subsets) of the 13 
indicators and added initial the GDP per capita level and period-fixed effects to all 
regressions. We have used the estimated models to answer three questions: 
 
•  First, we studied the impact of the crisis on the within-sample fit of cross-country 
growth regressions by presenting estimates both for the pre-crisis period and for an 
extended sample that also includes the crisis. The fitted values lead to easily-  28
interpretable results within sample. Comparing the 2000-07 sample to the 2000-10 
sample, the downward revision of fitted values of GDP growth from the regressions is 
between one and three percent per year for most countries.  
 
•  Second, while previous research has found a substantial ‘growth dividend’ from EU 
enlargement in the sense that new EU members grew faster than their fundamentals 
implied, we could confirm this finding only for the first half of the 2000s. In contrast, in 
the second half of the 2000s, the CEE10 states grew less than implied by their 
fundamentals. In the 2000s overall, the CEE10 states’ growth process seemed mostly in 
line with their fundamentals, ie these countries seemed to growth by about 0.3-0.4 
percent more than what would have implied by their fundamentals, though this result is 
not statistically significant. This finding does not at all mean that EU membership was 
neutral for the growth process of these countries, since the many positive effects 
discussed in European Commission (2009) have helped the development of 
fundamental growth drivers. In particular, EU membership has contributed to financial 
and trade integration, which boosted growth. We have also measured the effect of EU 
enlargement by comparing the baseline simulation from our models to a counterfactual 
simulation of ‘no enlargement’, in which we have set up hypothetical paths for the 
growth drivers based on the developments of non-EU middle income countries. We 
have indeed found that the incremental improvement of fundamentals due to EU 
enlargement likely had a positive impact on growth by about 0.15 percent per year in 
the second half of the 2000s. Among the other countries in the CEECCA region, the 
CIS countries were found to have a better growth performance that what would have 
implied by the fundamental growth drivers (though their advantage has declined from 
the first to the second half of the 2000s), while, on average, countries in the Balkans 
seemed to grow according to their fundamentals. 
 
•  Third, we studied prospects for post-crisis growth using our estimated models and by 
setting up hypothetical scenarios for the future development of growth drivers. We have 
set up some scenarios and analysed possible growth trajectories. Even in the optimistic 
scenario that assumes a return to the pre-crisis development of fundamentals and, in 
particular, to country-specific pre-crisis capital inflows and credit growth, medium-term 
outlooks are below pre-crisis actual growth, especially in those countries that 
experienced substantial credit and consumption booms before the crisis. There are three 
main effects behind this finding. First, part of the pre-crisis economic growth has likely   29
led to the development of positive output gaps, while our models obviously project 
potential growth and implicitly assume that the output gap will be zero. Second, the 
crisis has altered the estimated parameters of the models and the full-sample estimate 
associates less benign effects with capital inflows. And third, CEECCA countries 
achieved economic catching up toward the EU15 level when the full period of 2001-10 
is considered, which reduces conditional convergence-driven future growth. Even 
though actual growth rates might exceed potential growth rates in the coming years, as 
negative output gaps are diminishing, policymakers have to take into account reduced 
potential growth rates, and focus even more on growth-enhancing economic and 
structural policies. 
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